The Lancet has flagged nuclear conflict and the malicious application of AI as two critical risks of human extinction, but their regulatory landscapes appear to be poles apart. I believe our approach to preventing nuclear conflict is far more comprehensive than the measures we have adopted to regulate AI, and I base my view on three factors: legal obligations, the operational authority of regulators, and readiness for implementation.
In the nuclear field, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (191 states parties) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (adopted by 122 votes) create legally binding duties for their respective parties. IAEA safeguards are backed up by an inspection regime, and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization operates a global monitoring network, with 307 certified facilities reported in February 2026.
In stark contrast, the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the UK Parliament has warned that no country currently has an adequate approach to AI legislation and regulation. Existing legislation is fragmented, and the interactions between AI safety institutions and model builders can lack binding legal authority. Although the EU AI Act is already being implemented, some core obligations for high-risk AI systems will only apply from 2027 and 2028 respectively. According to OECD data, among 36 surveyed countries, only 12 reported independent oversight for government use of generative AI, while seven reported accountability frameworks. Nuclear regulation has established verification mechanisms, while comparable global AI governance remains fragmented.
The nuclear regime is, of course, far from perfect. New START expired in February 2026, with no successor treaty in place, while nuclear modernisation continues.
There has also been some movement in AI regulation. California’s Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act (SB 53), effective in 2026, establishes transparency, safety reporting and accountability requirements for major frontier AI developers. However, these efforts remain relatively new.
None of that changes my conclusion: without a global, institutionally credible, verifiable and enforceable regime comparable to established nuclear governance mechanisms, AI regulation remains fragmented across national and regional jurisdictions.
The seriousness of regulation must match the level of threat. If both risks have extinction potential, humanity should give AI regulation stronger legal obligations, effective oversight agencies and enforceable safety requirements.